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Abstract
In this paper we present a political-agency model in which voters exhibit a cognitive
deciency known as hindsight bias: after the uncertainty about an event is resolved, they
consider the realized outcome more foreseeable than it actually was. For their reelection
decision, voters evaluate the politician's ability based on the history of observed actions
and outcomes. High ability is dened as an informational advantage over voters as to the
welfare maximizing policy. This creates incentives for low-ability politicians to deviate
from the optimal policy choice in an attempt to be perceived as possessing superior private
information. We show that, because hindsight biased voters are less impressed than
rational voters when a risky policy succeeds in spite of public pessimism, the bias acts as
a discipline device on low-ability politicians and may thus be welfare enhancing. It also
increases political turnover compared to fully rational evaluation. While hindsight bias
benets voters in terms of politicians' discipline, its eects on selection are ambiguous.
These insights may be relevant to other principal-agent relationships without ex ante
commitment, e.g., promotion decisions in organizations.
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It is well documented in the psychology literature that many human beings exhibit hindsight
bias: in retrospect, they systematically overestimate the degree to which events were pre-
dictable. The bias can be expected to cause problems in various situations where a decision
maker is evaluated after the outcome of his actions is known and where there is no ex ante
contract mapping outcomes into performance assessments. It is widely believed to adversely
aect the legal system (Rachlinski, 1998; Viscusi, 2001; Harley, 2007); for instance, in judicial
assessments of liability, hindsight bias may lead courts to hold liable even defendants who
took reasonable care, given the information available at the time. Rachlinski (1998) argues
that courts have responded to this problem by developing various measures to mitigate the
eects of hindsight bias, and have been quite successful in containing it.1
In many respects, voters in a democracy have a task similar to that of jurors or judges
in a court of law: much like the latter have to assess whether a defendant took the right
precautions, the former need to evaluate whether an incumbent chose the right policies.
Given this similarity, one might expect that hindsight bias is as problematic in the political
system as in the legal system.2 A well-documented example of how the bias can in
uence
the public perception of policy choices, and arguably the outcome of elections, is the Gulf
war of 1991. Concerning President George Bush's decision to use military force against Iraq,
Mueller (1994, p. 87) reports:
In December 1990, respondents had split about 50/50 on a question asking whether
they preferred sanctions or military action. But when asked after the war how
they had felt before the war, those inclined to remember that they had supported
military action outnumbered those recalling their support for sanctions by nearly
four to one.
If voters considered the decision in retrospect as an easy call, such a belief surely was detri-
mental to the President's hope of being conrmed in oce.3 This suggests that hindsight
biased evaluation can have a distortionary eect on elections. Why is it then that political in-
stitutions have not evolved in ways that guard against the bias, as the law has? In this paper,
1 Rachlinski (1998) cites several rules which aim at reducing the bias, including suppression of evidence
(namely, the inadmissibility of post-accident remedial measures taken by the defendant as proof of negligence),
using the profession's ex ante customs as standard of \reasonableness" (as in medical malpractice cases) and
the adoption of no-liability rules (such as the business judgment rule: corporate executives generally are not
liable to shareholders for decisions that turn out badly).
2 Camerer et al. (1989, p. 1246), for example, voice concerns that the problem caused by hindsight bias
should be \especially acute in public decision making, in which principals are a diuse group of voters and
contracts are rarely explicit." Frey and Eichenberger (1991) and Gowda (1999) also mention the bias in
connection with politics.
3 We discuss this example in more detail in section 6.
2we argue that the bias may be less detrimental to the political system than to the legal system
{ surprisingly, we show that voters may even benet from being hindsight biased. While it is
true that hindsight bias leads to less accurate judgments, it also has a more indirect, strategic
eect on the decision maker's behavior. With respect to the latter eect, democratic elec-
tions dier from court trials because politicians, unlike defendants, have reelection concerns.4
A growing literature (reviewed below) nds that, when politicians have private information
about the optimal policy, these reelection concerns may lead to various forms of inecient
signaling. We show that hindsight bias on the part of voters reduces certain wasteful activi-
ties and may therefore be welfare-enhancing. In a nutshell, the argument is that a politician
may sometimes choose a policy he and the public believe to be overly risky, making it look
as if he were in possession of superior private information. If the gamble pays o, rational
voters are \surprised" and make an upward adjustment of their beliefs about the politician's
ability. Hindsight biased voters, however, think they knew all along that the policy was going
to work (they are not surprised), and do not give him as much credit. Therefore, when facing
hindsight biased voters, the politician is less tempted to engage in such behavior in the rst
place.
Starting with the work of Fischho (1975), psychological research on hindsight bias has
rmly established its robustness. It is not limited to college students but also aects surgeons,
judges and other experts; moreover, teaching people to avoid the bias has proven tremendously
dicult.5 Given its pervasiveness, it has been suggested that hindsight bias is also likely to
be relevant in a number of real-world situations without ex ante commitment. This includes
the examples mentioned above, i.e., courts judging the liability of an injurer and voters in
a democratic election assessing the competence of a politician, but also covers situations
as diverse as human resource managers choosing whether to promote an employee or an
organization deciding whether to re-appoint an expert.6
This paper focuses on political-economy issues.7 In our model, a politician whose ability
is unknown to voters has to choose between a risky and a safe policy. While voters and
4 Another important dierence is that liability law, which is designed to give agents incentives to take the
ecient level of care, addresses a fundamental con
ict of interest between society and potential injurers. By
contrast, politicians' and voters' interests do not necessarily diverge as strongly because social welfare probably
is an argument of many politicians' utility function (if only because they are drawn from the pool of citizens).
5 For a review of the vast literature on hindsight bias consult Hawkins and Hastie (1990). In particular,
hindsight bias has been demonstrated by Detmer et al. (1978) in surgeons and by Anderson et al. (1993) in
state and federal judges. On the diculties of debiasing see, e.g., Hoch and Loewenstein (1989).
6 In all of those cases, hindsight bias can be expected to decrease the accuracy of the evaluation. The
consequences of hindsight bias are not limited to these kinds of situations. It is also said to impair learning
from the past by portfolio managers (Biais and Weber, 2006) or strategic planners (Bukszar and Connolly,
1988).
7 Nevertheless, our analysis may be applicable to some of the other problems mentioned above, as we
discuss in the conclusion.
3low-ability politicians obtain only an imperfect signal of which policy is preferable ex ante,
high-ability politicians know the state of the world with certainty. We assume that the public
signal is informative, so eciency requires that the low type always choose the policy suggested
by the signal. This setup creates incentives for a low-ability politician to ineciently ignore
publicly available information about the welfare-maximizing policy in an attempt to \look
smart", i.e., to make it seem as if he had superior private information, the trademark of
competent politicians. To see why, consider what happens in case of fully rational voters,
noting that a high-ability politician always chooses the right policy and thus disregards the
publicly observed signal. If the low-ability politician always follows the signal, rational voters
infer that any politician who chooses a policy that is contrary to the signal must be of
high ability; thus, choosing an unpopular policy acts as a signal of competence. We show
that if the signal is not too precise and the politician cares suciently about reelection, the
equilibrium with fully rational voters has the low-ability politician randomizing between the
policy suggested by the signal and doing exactly the opposite. Of course, this randomizing
behavior is detrimental to welfare because policy choices are not optimal given the available
information.
We assume that voters suering from hindsight bias distort their recollection of the signal
so as to make it consistent with the realized outcome. If the signal suggested that the safe
policy was optimal, but the politician successfully enacts a risky policy, then voters wrongly
believe that the signal had suggested all along that the risky policy was the right choice (they
think they knew it all along). Therefore, with hindsight biased voters, some of the gain in
reputation that follows from an unpopular policy which then turns out to be a success is
destroyed, because ex post, biased voters think that it was the obvious choice anyway. We
assume that politicians are aware of voters' behavioral decision making.8 Anticipating voters'
biased belief updating, the low-ability politician chooses a suboptimal policy less often when
voters are hindsight biased then when they are perfectly rational. Thus, hindsight bias on the
part of voters acts as a discipline device by reducing incentives for the low-ability politician
to engage in inecient signaling.
The disciplining eect of hindsight biased policy evaluation is unambiguously benecial
for voters' rst-period welfare. However, an overall welfare assessment also has to take into
account the second (i.e., post-election) period. We analyze how hindsight bias aects the
selection of the second-period politician and show that it operates through two channels. First,
biased voters hold erroneous posteriors about the incumbent's ability, sometimes leading them
to elect the wrong candidate. Second, hindsight bias may also generate osetting benets in
8 This is in line with statements from political scientists who acknowledge that \politicians typically have
a strong intuitive understanding of voters' heuristics and biases" (Gowda, 1999, p. 71).
4terms of inferences about the politician's type { in fact, by inducing more discipline on the
low type's part, the bias can make it easier for voters to distinguish low from high-ability
politicians. The overall selection eect is indeterminate: depending on parameters, hindsight
bias may increase or decrease voters' second-period welfare. We nevertheless derive a polar
case in which we are able to isolate the rst of the two eects. When signal precision is such
that dierences between equilibrium strategies are small, the bias is sure to be detrimental.
These qualications notwithstanding, if voters discount future payos at a suciently high
rate, hindsight bias can be welfare-enhancing regardless of what happens in the second period.
Finally, we nd that both the low- and the high-ability politician are less likely to be reelected
when voters are hindsight biased. Hence, the bias increases political turnover.
One important departure from the political economy literature is our assumption that
voters obtain an informative signal about the state of the world, just like politicians do, and
that the signal coincides with that of low-ability politicians. This re
ects the idea that voters
are exposed to a certain amount of policy relevant public information (e.g., from the media).
Note that, nevertheless, politicians on average still have \expertise", i.e., they are more likely
to have correct information concerning the underlying state of the world than voters.
Our contribution to the literature is twofold; the rst is in terms of behavioral economics,
the second in terms of political economy. Our result that a behavioral bias ca improve welfare
is similar in spirit to Compte and Postlewaite (2004), B enabou and Tirole (2002) and K oszegi
(2006). Those papers, however, consider how a psychological bias (namely, overcondence)
aects intrapersonal welfare.9 By contrast, we investigate how a bias on the part of one
group of agents (voters) can aect the behavior of other agents (politicians) in a way that
increases the former's welfare.10 Moreover, we are able to use a standard welfare measure
that is unaected by which \self" of an individual one considers; nor does it involve belief
consumption.
Our paper also extends the literature on political agency,11 in particular by going beyond
the standard rational-voter assumption and instead considering behavioral decision making,
as suggested by Besley (2006). Moreover, our basic model is related to the recent literature
9 In Compte and Postlewaite (2004), an agent's self-condence aects his performance at a task.
Information-processing biases such as repressing memories of bad performance can improve the individual's
welfare by boosting his condence, thus helping him do better. B enabou and Tirole (2002) show how over-
condence can help an individual overcome time inconsistency and thus improve his well-being (at least from
an ex ante (\self zero") perspective). K oszegi (2006) lets individuals consume their self-perception, so that an
overly positive self-image can raise utility.
10 Camerer et al. (1989) speculate on the fact that a related phenomenon which they refer to as the \curse
of knowledge" may be welfare-enhancing by (partly) eliminating market ineciencies caused by asymmetric
information. Their argument is very dierent from ours, though.
11 See Persson and Tabellini (2000) or Chapter 3 in Besley (2006) for a recent overview of political agency
models.
5on the dysfunctional eects of electoral accountability which can arise when politicians have
better information than voters. Majumdar and Mukand (2004), whose basic model is similar
to ours, demonstrate that reelection concerns may lead to inecient experimentation and
policy persistence. Harrington (1993) shows that, in the presence of reelection pressures, an
otherwise benevolent politician may choose the policy most likely to be well received by voters,
rather than the one he himself believes to be welfare-maximizing. Similarly, in Maskin and
Tirole (2004) and Smart and Sturm (2006), reelection concerns not only reduce opportunism
by bad politicians, but also distort good politicians' behavior. Politicians may diverge from
their preferred (and socially optimal) policy, and choose a popular policy instead, in order
to signal their congruence with voters, a behavior sometimes referred to as pandering. In
Dewatripont and Seabright (2006), politicians signal that they care about voters through
wasteful spending on public projects. In the paper most closely related to ours, Canes-
Wrone et al. (2001) investigate the case where politicians try to signal competence rather
than congruence. They also obtain a pandering result: in their model, politicians may choose
a suboptimal policy simply because it is popular among voters, provided that there is a low
probability that voters learn the policy outcome before the election.
Pandering contrasts with the ineciency in our model, where politicians signal their ability
by choosing an unpopular policy. A number of authors obtain this kind of distortion. Canes-
Wrone et al. (2001) derive cases for which a politician may engage in something they call
\fake leadership": he acts against both popular belief and his private signal, trying to be
perceived as a leader.12 Similar results are obtained by Levy (2004) for the case of decision
makers with career concerns. The decision makers in her model display a behavior labeled
\anti-herding", i.e., they have a tendency to take decisions contradicting the public prior.13
In Prat (2005), the agent may disregard valuable private information in an attempt to mimic
the more able type.14 As a result, the principal may be better o not observing the agent's
action.
The nding that, for a principal, less information can be better than more is a common
12 It is interesting that, while conventional wisdom holds that pandering on the part of politicians is common,
this view is far from unanimous among political scientists; see, for example, Jacobs and Shapiro (2000) whose
book is provocatively titled \Politicians Don't Pander". The authors claim that politicians' responsiveness to
public opinion has been low over the past decades. This view is backed by Monroe (1998) who nds that only
55 percent of policies enacted in the US between 1980 and 1993 were consistent with the opinion of a majority
of voters.
13 Low-ability politicians' behavior in our model also bears some resemblance to Allen and Gorton (1993),
where bad brokers pretend to have superior private information allowing them to identify undervalued stocks,
but actually just speculate, and to models where players have a strategy labeled \gambling for resurrection"
(see Downs and Rocke (1994) for a political economy application), since they are choosing a policy that is a
long shot.
14 In Prat's (2005) model, one realization of the signal is better news about the agent's type than the other
(Prat calls it the \smart" realization), and the bad agent may choose the action corresponding to the \smart"
realization rather than follow his true signal.
6theme in setups where the principal lacks commitment power. It is a feature of Cr emer
(1995), for example, where the principal may forego a costless monitoring technology in order
to increase the agent's incentives. In our model, incentives for the low type are improved due
to voters' distorted memories; it is their hindsight bias that destroys information. Although it
is well known that restrictions on information acquisition can be benecial for the principal,
our contribution is to show that a psychological bias can have such an eect.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the main model
while section 3 then establishes the benchmark rational-evaluation equilibrium. In section 4
we dene a hindsight biased information structure, determine the equilibrium under biased
policy evaluation and compare it to the rational equilibrium. A discussion follows thereafter.
Selection and welfare implications of hindsight biased policy evaluation are studied in section
5. Finally, section 6 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Basic model
In the simple two-period political agency model we consider, a politician (decision maker)
chooses an action and then a possibly biased electorate (evaluator) judges the decision's
quality. For the sake of clarity, we start by introducing the model under rational evaluation
while assumptions for hindsight biased evaluation are deferred to section 4.
Information
In each period, the state of the world ! can be either 0 or 1. Politicians and voters receive
an imperfect public signal  2 f0;1g about the state of the world. The probability that
the signal is correct (i.e., that the state of the world is the one indicated by the signal) is
0  Pr[! = 0j0] 2 (0;1) in case of 0 and 1  Pr[! = 1j1] 2 (0;1) in case of 1. We
will refer to  as signal precision. There are two possible actions a 2 fa0;a1g from which the
decision maker can choose. Policy a0 is riskless and a1 is risky.15 The policy outcome (in
terms of voters' payo) is y 2 f0;g. Action a0 always yields a payo of 0 to society, while
action a1 costs c and delivers a payo of  if ! = 1, and 0 if ! = 0. We assume  > c > 0
so that a1 yields a higher payo than a0 if and only if ! = 1.
A politician can either be of high (H) or low (L) ability and each politician knows his own
type  2 fL;Hg. The prior probability I 2 (0;1) that the incumbent is of high ability
is common knowledge. High ability is dened as an informational advantage over voters as
15 Such an asymmetry is inherent in many policy choices, such as the decision between peace and war or
between maintaining the status quo and implementing a reform. From a more pragmatic point of view, it
greatly simplies the analysis.
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Figure 1: Timing of the game (term 1)
to the welfare-maximizing policy. While a low-ability politician only learns the signal (),
a high-ability politician also knows the state of the world (!) with certainty. The following
assumption regarding the signal's informativeness is imposed:
Assumption 1 Signal precision satises




This assumption ensures that, given signal !, social welfare is maximized if the low-ability
politician implements policy a!.
Timing
The game is played in two periods (interpreted as terms in oce). Period 1 is divided into
four stages, see gure 1. At date t = 0, nature draws the incumbent's type , the state of the
world ! and the signal . All types of politicians and voters observe the public signal  but
only type H politicians learn the state of the world !. At t = 1, the incumbent decides which
action to implement. At date t = 2, the outcome of the policy is realized and learned by all
players. At date t = 3, the election stage of the game, voters choose between the incumbent
and a challenger. The electorate's perception of the challenger (i.e., the probability that the
challenger is of high ability) is C, randomly drawn from a distribution on [0;1].16 In the
second period, following a draw of ! and , the appointed politician takes an action. After
that, the second-period outcome is realized and publicly observed. Then, the game ends.
Politicians and voters
Voters' task is to decide whether to reelect or replace the incumbent. Their strategy
16 For simplicity we assume a representative voter in the sense of a pivotal median voter. This assumption
implies that politicians act as if confronted with homogeneous voters' beliefs, that is all voters hold the same
beliefs about the government. Alternatively, the setup might be interpreted as representing an electorate with
three groups of voters: two equally strong partisan groups which always vote for their party's candidate, and
a third group of \independent voters" who vote for the candidate which they perceive as more competent,
regardless of his aliation.
8consists of a probability distribution over the actions \reelect the incumbent" and \elect
the challenger" for each possible combination of signal, action, outcome, and challenger's
perceived ability. Voters' payo equals expected discounted social welfare; their discount
factor is given by  2 [0;1]. The politician's preferences are given by17
u = W + (1   )Pr[reelection];
where W is social welfare in the current period and  2 (0;1) a weighting factor that deter-
mines a politician's relative concern for welfare and reelection.18 Since there are no reelection
concerns in the second term, politician's and voters' objectives are perfectly aligned. All
politicians try to maximize welfare in the second term but are not equally good at it. Vot-
ers' optimal strategy is therefore to elect the candidate they perceive as more competent.
Let (;a;y) denote voters' posterior belief that the politician is of type H given recalled
signal , policy choice a and realized outcome y.19 Belief  is also referred to as the incum-
bent's reputation. The optimal strategy for voters is to reelect the incumbent if and only if
C  (;a;y). We assume that C is uniformly distributed on [0;1]. Thus, the incumbent's
reelection probability is equal to the voters' posterior belief that he is of high ability.
The politician's payo is his expected utility U. Let  denote a mixed action such that
the politician plays a1 with probability  and a0 with probability 1   . Hence, expected
utility given voters' behavior and the information available to the politician is
U(;;	) = 





+ (1   )(1   )(;a0;0);
where 	 is the politician's (type dependent) information set:
	 =
(
(!;) for  = H
 for  = L:
A politician's strategy prescribes a probability s(;	) of playing a1 for each type  and
17 The assumption that all types of politician care about social welfare, as well as holding oce, can be
justied, for example, by the fact that politicians are drawn from the population of voters. Thus, they can
be expected to consume the same goods as the rest of the electorate. While this formulation follows authors
such as Rogo (1990), Harrington (1993), Canes-Wrone et al. (2001) and Majumdar and Mukand (2004), one
should note that it is in contrast with other political-agency models which assume that at least some types
of politician have their own agenda. This is true for the early work of Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) who
use a pure moral hazard framework, but also for more recent contributions who, for the most part, assume
that there are both \good" and \bad" types of politician, where good types generally have objectives which
are \congruent" with society's whereas bad types favor a special-interest group (see, e.g., Coate and Morris
(1995), Maskin and Tirole (2004) and Smart and Sturm (2006)). Reasonable people can disagree whether the
congruence or competence dimension is more important in politics. Note, however, that for many political
decisions, there are no in
uential special-interest groups to which politicians might give into.
18 All players are risk neutral. Notice also that 1    implicitly includes the politician's discount factor.
19 For rational voters, unlike for hindsight biased voters, the recollected signal  always coincides with the
original signal.
9each possible realization of 	.20 We can now dene our equilibrium concept, which is a
rened version of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). We omit the voters' strategy from the
denition because of its simplicity.
Denition 1 An equilibrium is a PBE of the game such that (i) strategies are optimal given
beliefs, i.e.,
8 ;8 	; s(;	) 2 argmax
 U(;;	);




I Pr[;a;yjH] + (1   I)Pr[;a;yjL]
;
(iii) voters hold pessimistic out-of-equilibrium beliefs, i.e., (;a;y) = 0 for any triplet
(;a;y) that is o the equilibrium path, and (iv) the D1 criterion is satised.
The two renements (points (iii) and (iv)) allow us to select a unique equilibrium.21 In
what follows we drop the politician's type from the specication of strategies as this cannot
lead to confusion. Thus, we write s(!;) for s(H;(!;)) and s() for s(L;). We look for
an equilibrium in which the high-ability politician always implements the welfare-maximizing
policy, that is, he chooses the policy corresponding to the state of nature. Formally, s(0;) = 0
and s(1;) = 1, regardless of .22
In the next section, we establish the existence of equilibrium under the assumption of
perfect rationality on the part of all players and thereafter extend the analysis to the case of
hindsight biased voters.
3 Equilibrium with rational voters
With rational voters, the game has two independent subgames, one for each realization of the
signal , which we will analyze in turn.
20 In game-theoretic terms, there are, strictly speaking three types of politician in this model: two types
of high-ability politician { one for each realization of the rst-period state of the world { and one type of
low-ability politician. We have chosen to label types in more intuitive terms for greater clarity of exposition.
21 The role of pessimistic beliefs will become clear below. The D1 criterion rules out equilibrium candidates
where both types of politician pool on one action (either a0 or a1) independent of their information, as we
demonstrate in appendix B.
22 Note, however, that we do not assume that high-ability politicians play in such a way; rather, their

































Figure 2: The 0 subgame
The 0 subgame
Assume  = 0, that is, the signal suggests that the state of the world is ! = 0, and thus
that policy a0 is optimal for welfare. We start by specifying voters' posterior beliefs about
the politician's type given an observed triplet (0;a;y) and the low type's strategy s(0); see
gure 2 which is based on the high type playing mechanically (as explained at the end of
section 2). Applying Bayes' rule and pessimistic beliefs, we have, for any 0  s(0)  1,23
(0;a0;0) =
I0







I + (1   I)s(0)
:
Denote a low-ability politician's expected utility from playing a0 by U0
0, where the super-
script stands for the signal  and the subscript for the chosen policy a. We have
U0
0 =   0 + (1   )  (0;a0;0)
= (1   )
I0




23 If s() = 0, observing (;a1;0) is an out-of-equilibrium event for which (;a1;0) = 0 by pessimistic
beliefs. Hence, voters think that any politician whose policy fails must be of low ability. This seems quite
natural, not least since it is exactly the belief Bayes' rule species for any s() > 0. Such beliefs would also
obtain if there were an additional type of low-ability politician who has a preference for risky actions and thus
always plays a1 regardless of his signal.
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(1   0)   c
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+ (1   )
(1   0)I
I + (1   I)s(0)
: (2)
We will categorize equilibria according to the low type's equilibrium strategy: when
s(0) = 0, we will talk about pure-strategy equilibrium, while for 0 < s(0) < 1 (the low
type randomizes between a0 and a1), we will talk about mixed-strategy equilibrium.24 For a
pure-strategy equilibrium, it must be the case that the low-ability politician prefers a0 over
a1 even if voters believe that s(0) = 0, i.e., voters think that any politician who chooses a1
and succeeds must be of high type. In that case, the low type could fool voters into thinking




1 , then we are in a pure-strategy equilibrium.25 Otherwise, we are in a mixed-
strategy equilibrium where the high type always chooses the \right" policy while the low type
randomizes between actions a0 and a1. For him to be willing to do so, he must be indierent
between the two policies, that is, both must procure him equal utility in expectation. This
requires that voters hold the appropriate beliefs. Lemma 1 describes the conditions under
which these equilibria obtain.
Lemma 1 Suppose voters are rational. There exists a unique equilibrium in the 0 subgame
characterized by a threshold R
0 such that the high-ability politician chooses a0 when ! = 0 and
a1 when ! = 1, while the low-ability politician always chooses a0 when 0  R
0 and randomizes
between a0 and a1 when 0 < R
0 . In the latter case, type L's equilibrium probability of playing
a1, s


















R(0) decreases with 0. The threshold R










1   I(1   R
0 )
  (1   R
0 ): (4)
24 In the 0 subgame, an equilibrium where the high type always chooses the policy corresponding to the
underlying state of nature and where s(0) = 1 (i.e., the low type always does the opposite of what the signal
suggests) can be ruled out. To see why, note rst that in this kind of equilibrium, voters believe that any
politician who does follow the signal and plays a0 must be of high ability with probability 1. Thus, the low
type can increase his reputation by choosing the policy the signal suggests. Moreover, in terms of expected
social welfare, the low type is always better o following the signal. Therefore, choosing the \wrong" policy
a1 all the time cannot be an equilibrium. This is shown formally in the proof of Lemma 1.
25 Technically, it would be inappropriate to talk about a separating equilibrium since from a game-theoretic
point of view, the model has three types; see footnote 20. The two high-ability types play pure strategies
corresponding to the state of nature. Hence, whatever the action the low type plays, he always \pools" with

































Figure 3: The 1 subgame
For this threshold to be located in the admissible interval, i.e., R
0 2 (1   c=;1), it must be
the case that I < c
( c)2+c.
Thus, there is a threshold value of signal precision above which we are in a pure-strategy
equilibrium where the low type always follows the public signal, and below which we are in a
mixed-strategy equilibrium where the low type randomizes. In the mixed-strategy case, the
equilibrium probability of playing a1 decreases with the signal precision.
The condition I < c
( c)2+c says that the prior probability of the politician being of
high ability cannot be too large. Otherwise, the politician's reputation from implementing a0
is so high that gambling on a1 is never worthwhile, even when the signal is of low precision.
Hence, if this assumption is violated, the politician always follows his signal, regardless of its
quality; there is never any randomization by the low type.
The 1 subgame
Now assume that  = 1, suggesting that a1 should be implemented. Posterior beliefs for
the 1 subgame, depicted in gure 3, are given by
(1;a0;0) =
I(1   1)







I + (1   I)s(1)
:
When the low-ability politician plays a1, his expected utility is
U1
1 = (1   c) + (1   )
h
(1   1)(1;a1;0) + 1 (1;a1;)
i
= (1   c) + (1   )
1I
I + (1   I)s(1)
: (5)
13Playing a0 would procure him utility
U1
0 = (1   )(1;a0;0)
= (1   )
I(1   1)




Lemma 2 describes the equilibrium in the 1 subgame. It is similar to the one in the 0
subgame, with one important qualication: due to the fact that playing a1 is risky (unlike a0)
and, in case of failure, leads to a bad reputation, there can now be a pure-strategy equilibrium
with s(1) = 0 under certain conditions on parameters; that is, the low-ability politician never
follows the signal.26
Lemma 2 Suppose voters are rational. There exists a unique equilibrium in the 1 subgame
characterized by thresholds R
1 and R
1 such that the high-ability politician chooses a0 when
! = 0 and a1 when ! = 1, while the low-ability politician always chooses a0 when 1  R
1 ,
randomizes between a0 and a1 when R
1 < 1 < R
1 , and always chooses a1 when 1  R
1 . In





(1   c) =
I(1   1)










R(1) increases with 1. Threshold R












1 2 (c=;1) requires I > c
( c)2+c. Threshold R
1 > R




1    c) = 1   R
1 I;
having R
1 2 (c=;1) requires I > 1  
( c)
1  .
As in the 0 subgame, the low type's equilibrium strategy in the 1 subgame depends on
signal precision. If I > c
( c)2+c, the low-ability politician always does the opposite of what
the signal suggests for very low values of 1. For intermediate values of 1, the equilibrium
has the low-ability politician randomizing. If the condition I > 1  
( c)
1  is satised, the
low type always follows the signal for high values of precision. Otherwise, the signal is never
suciently precise to induce a pure strategy, even when 1 is arbitrarily close to 1. Reelection
concerns are so strong that the low-ability politician randomizes whatever the signal quality.
Figure 4 depicts the low type's equilibrium strategy as a function of the signal precision for
both subgames for the case where 1  
( c)
1  < I < c
( c)2+c.

























Figure 4: Equilibrium strategies for type L with rational voters
Corollary 1 The probability that type L plays a0 (a1) is greater (smaller) after receiving
signal 0 than after receiving signal 1: s
R(0)  s
R(1). The inequality is strict if I <
c
( c)2+c.
This follows directly from Assumption 1 (which implies that 1 > 1   0) and the mono-
tonicity properties of the equilibrium strategies, noting that s
R(0) would equal s
R(1) if
1 = 1   0. The only case where the inequality is not strict arises when 1 < R
1 (for which
I > c
( c)2+c is necessary) so that s
R(0) = s
R(1) = 0.
4 Hindsight bias as a discipline device
Voters are hindsight biased if their recalled prior about the state of the world diverges from
their original prior once they have learned new information about which state truly prevails.27
More precisely, the bias alters voters' recollection in direction of the publicly observed out-
come. It can be formalized using conditional expectations (Camerer et al., 1989):
E[E(!j)j;a;y] = bE(!j;a;y) + (1   b)E(!j);
where b 2 [0;1] measures the degree of hindsight bias. The bias translates into a violation of
the law of iterated expectations and as a result the recalled prior belief about ! is located
somewhere between the true prior and the posterior probability. However, in the binary model,
there are only two possible priors, one for each realization of the signal: E(!j0) = 1   0
and E(!j1) = 1. Without restrictions on b, an evaluator's set of recalled prior probabilities
27 Or, as Rabin (1998, p. 30) puts it, \people exaggerate the degree to which their beliefs before an
informative event would be similar to their current beliefs".
15would be dierent from the set of possible original prior probabilities. We therefore choose a
formulation of hindsight bias that is consistent with the set of prior beliefs an evaluator may
originally hold about the state of the world.
Denition 2 (Hindsight bias with a binary signal) Hindsight biased voters overestimate
the accuracy of their prior belief about the state of the world: If  = 0 and they learn that
! = 1, they think that ex ante they attached probability 1 to the state of the world being 1
even though their original signal suggested probability 1   0 < 1. Thus, they erroneously
believe that the signal was 1 rather than 0. Similarly, if  = 1 and they learn that ! = 0,
hindsight biased voters think that their prior was 0 even when according to their signal it was
1   1 < 0; they think that their signal was 0 rather than 1.
The safe policy a0 is uninformative for voters in terms of its outcome.28 The recollection
of prior probabilities is only altered when new information about the state of the world
is revealed, i.e., when the risky policy a1 is implemented. After policy a1, voters learn
the state of the world with certainty: posterior beliefs over ! are E(!j;a1;) = 1 and
E(!j;a1;0) = 0.29 Table 1 summarizes biased voters' recalled signal as a function of outcome
y.
Original signal
(after a1)  = 0  = 1
y = 0 0 0
y =  1 1
Table 1: Biased recollection of original signal 
In solving for the equilibrium of the game with hindsight biased voters we assume that
politicians anticipate voters' hindsight bias and maintain the assumption that voters know
the politician's equilibrium strategy.30 One generally has to consider both subgames. It turns
out, however, that the 1 subgame is unaected by hindsight bias. In case of failure of a risky
policy, the bias changes an evaluator's posterior belief from (1;a1;0) to B(1;a1;0) =
(0;a1;0). But these posteriors are both equal to zero, whatever the low type's equilibrium
strategy, because of the assumption of pessimistic beliefs. Therefore, when  = 1, the
28 Action a0 always leads to outcome y = 0 and in this case signals are not distorted by hindsight biased
evaluators because E(!j0;a0;0) = E(!j0) and E(!j1;a0;0) = E(!j1).
29 We can then identify the parameter b which implicitly underlies our setup as 1 = b1+(1 b)(1 0) ()
b = (1 + 0   1)=0 in the 0 subgame, and 1   0 = b  0 + (1   b)1 () b = (1 + 0   1)=1 in the 1
subgame.
30 See section 4.2 for a discussion concerning players' bias awareness and its implications.
16hindsight biased equilibrium strategies, s
B(1) for the low type and s
B(!;1) for the high
type, are the same as in the equilibrium with rational voters, see Lemma 2.31 This only leaves
the subgame following signal 0 to be analyzed.
Unlike under rational evaluation, the 0 subgame under biased evaluation is not inde-
pendent of the 1 subgame. This is because the evaluator calculates his posterior about the
politician's type with a biased prior probability. As will become clear, posterior beliefs { and
hence, equilibrium strategies { in the 0 subgame depend on the equilibrium strategy s
R(1)
of the 1 subgame.32 For the remainder of our analysis, we make an assumption that ensures
that hindsight bias is relevant.
Assumption 2 The following condition on parameters holds:
I <
c
(   c)2 + c
:
If this assumption is not satised, the low type's equilibrium strategy is s
R(0) = 0 regardless
of the quality of 0, and hindsight bias has no impact whatsoever.
4.1 Equilibrium with biased voters
Assume  = 0, so the signal implies (by Assumption 1) that action a0 is optimal in terms
of welfare. The voters' posterior beliefs about the politician's type depend on the observed
event (a;y), the recalled signal and the politician's strategy. As before, we start from the
premise that the high type chooses the optimal policy given the state of the world. We then
show that this is indeed an equilibrium. By Bayes' rule and the assumption of pessimistic
beliefs, biased voters' posterior beliefs are, for any 0  s(0)  1,
(0;a0;0) =
I0





B(0;a1;) = (1;a1;) =
I
I + (1   I)s
R(1)
:
The eects of hindsight bias come directly into play at the posterior belief for realization
(0;a1;). Upon observing outcome , biased voters learn that the state of the world is
! = 1. They then distort their recollection of the prior belief, which was based on the original
signal 0, toward their ex post information by wrongly believing that the signal had been 1,
therefore B(0;a1;) = (1;a1;). The expected utility for the L type if he plays action
a0 is
U0
0 =   0 + (1   )  (0;a0;0); (8)









R(!;1) for a high type.
32 The reverse is not true since the 1 subgame is unaected by hindsight bias, as mentioned above.





(1   0)   c

+ (1   )

0 (0;a1;0) + (1   0)B(0;a1;)

: (9)




if voters believe s(0) = 0. Otherwise we are in a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which the low
type randomizes between a0 and a1 such that U0
0 = U
0;B
1 , with voters correctly anticipating
equilibrium strategies. Lemma 3 describes equilibrium behavior with hindsight biased voters
in the 0 subgame.
Lemma 3 Suppose voters are hindsight biased. There exists a unique equilibrium in the 0
subgame characterized by a threshold B
0 such that the high-ability politician chooses a0 when
! = 0 and a1 when ! = 1, while the low-ability politician always chooses a0 when 0  B
0
and randomizes between a0 and a1 when 0 < B
0 . In the latter case, type L's equilibrium
probability of playing a1, s


















B(0) decreases with 0. The threshold B



















0 to be in the admissible range, i.e., B













As in the case of rational voters, the low type's behavior depends on the precision of 0:
for high values of 0, the low-ability politician implements a0, for low values he randomizes
between a0 and a1. However, the cuto and the equilibrium probability of playing a1 for
a given 0 are not the same as with rational voters. The following proposition assesses the
impact of hindsight bias on the low-ability politician's decision making.
Proposition 1 For any 0 < R




Proposition 1 means that, in terms of rst-period social welfare, voters benet from being
hindsight biased. The intuition for this result is the following. Biased voters are less easily
impressed by deviating behavior. They consider the outcome  in retrospect more predictable
than it actually was, and therefore think that playing a1 was the \obvious" policy choice even





















Figure 5: Rational and biased equilibrium strategies for type L
event came from a low type, which reduces their esteem for the incumbent.33 Anticipating
voters' bias, a low-ability politician knows that he has relatively little to gain from deviating
to policy a1, and accordingly, will do so less often. This is illustrated in gure 5, in which
equilibrium strategies for a low-ability decision maker in the 0 subgame under rational and
biased evaluation are contrasted.
4.2 Discussion
We discuss the psychological foundation of hindsight bias and then look at voters' bias aware-
ness and robustness to alternative assumptions.
Imperfect memory or self-serving bias
In psychology, judgment biases are explained by either motivational or cognitive theories.
Motivational theories rationalize the existence of a judgment bias by a deliberate but often
subconscious choice of the decision maker who may derive a (psychological) benet from it.34
In cognitive theories a judgment bias is attributed to information processing eects. Even
though motivational aspects may reinforce hindsight bias, research in psychology seems to
identify cognitive eects as its main source (Hawkins and Hastie, 1990; Horage et al., 2000).
Therefore, we assume that self-serving eects play no role for voters in our problem and rather
model hindsight bias as a by-product of knowledge updating after outcome information has
33 Voters wrongly recall their prior as 1 and therefore think the low type's equilibrium strategy is s

R(1).
By Corollary 1, a low-ability politician is more likely to play a1 after 1 than after 0.
34 Hindsight bias may be self-serving for various reasons. An individual may want to distort his recollection
of the original prior because he derives a benet from appearing smart in front of others or himself. Moreover,
suppression of changes in probability assessments over time decreases an individual's perception of uncertainty
in the world.
19been received.35 According to cognitive theories, a biased evaluator's default memory consists
of current, up to date probability estimates but does not stock all previously formed prior
probabilities because new information about the true state of the world destroys or reduces
their accessibility.36 Thus, a subject has to follow a mental strategy to reconstruct the original
prior from the default information he holds ex post; this is what Hawkins and Hastie (1990,
p. 321) call \reconstruction of the prior judgment by `rejudging' the outcome".
Awareness
To solve the model with hindsight bias we use a variation of perfect Bayesian equilibrium
(PBE) which captures memory imperfections on the part of evaluators. Our approach relies
on the assumption that politicians anticipate voters' hindsight bias and that voters correctly
predict the equilibrium strategy used by a politician for each realization of the signal.37
However, voters' posterior beliefs are based on the strategy associated with the signal they
recall, rather than the original signal. Therefore they may hold incorrect posterior beliefs,
but the mistake stems solely from the erroneous recollection of the prior and not from wrong
expectations about strategies.
Notice also that voters are naive, that is ex post unaware of their bias: they are certain
that they correctly remember the signal. Voters' imperfect recollection process thus hinders
conscious learning and implies a reduction of surprises of any kind. A natural extension is
to depart from the assumption of na vet e. Suppose evaluators are aware of their possibly
distorted recollection of the ex ante signal at the voting stage, i.e., they are sophisticated.38
Denote the probability that the signal corresponds to the underlying state of nature by x 
Pr[!j!] with ! 2 f0;1g, and the probability that the state of the world is 0 by  2 (0;1).39
The reliability of voters' memory is the probability that the recollected signal corresponds to
the original one. We denote the reliability of a recalled signal 1 (given event (a1;)) by r.
35 An alternative modeling approach, in the spirit of B enabou and Tirole (2006), would give the evaluator
an opportunity for memory manipulation, or (motivated) manipulation of own beliefs about the world.
36 Horage et al. (2000) emphasize the fact that for subjects with capacity-constrained memory, holding
current information in memory is, for general tasks, more important and accurate than remembering past prior
probabilities which are, by denition, based on outdated information. For a memory-based model of bounded
rationality in economic theory see Mullainathan (2002); there, as in our model, a decision maker takes the
recalled history of signals as the true history.
37 In fact, it does not matter whether voters calculate strategies themselves or whether they learn them
from experience or other sources, although the interpretations are dierent. In the former case voters are aware
of their hindsight bias ex ante, but not ex post. Interestingly, such behavior is consistent with a recent study
by DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) which shows that even voters who are aware of biased media coverage on
television do not fully subtract the broadcaster's political bias in their voting decision. In the latter case they
are ignorant of their bias, or naive, at all stages of the game.
38 For a model where individuals forget or repress information, but are aware of the deciencies of their
memory, see B enabou and Tirole (2002).
39 Since 0 =
x
x+(1 )(1 x) and 1 =
(1 )x







consistent with Assumption 1.
20We then have
r =
x (I + (1   I)s
R(1))
x (I + (1   I)s




S(0) is the equilibrium strategy under sophisticated evaluation. A L type's payo
from playing a1 after 0 becomes
U
0;S
1 = [(1   0)   c] + (1   )(1   0)
h
r(1;a1;) + (1   r)(0;a1;)
i
: (13)
In the next proposition, we compare the low-ability politician's equilibrium strategy under
sophistication to the benchmark results with rational and naive hindsight biased voters.
Proposition 2 Sophistication lowers the impact of hindsight bias but does not eliminate its
disciplining eect on low-ability politicians: s
B(0)  s
S(0) < s
R(0) for any 0 < R
0 .
Thus, the positive eect of hindsight bias on discipline demonstrated in Proposition 1 is
robust to dierent awareness assumptions. Intuitively, since a politician's reputation with
sophisticated voters (last term in (13)) is a convex combination of those with naive hindsight
biased and rational voters, the essence of the previous analysis remains intact, although the
magnitude of the eect may be reduced.
Robustness to alternative assumptions
So far we have assumed that the entire electorate is hindsight biased. What happens if
a fraction  of the population is rational? In case of a successful gamble (a1;) and an ex
ante signal 0, a fraction  of voters has belief (0;a1;) while a fraction 1    has belief
(1;a1;). Hindsight biased voters' opinion about the election decision diers from that
of rational voters only if the challenger's perceived ability C satises (1;a1;) < C <
(0;a1;). In that case, the rational fraction of the population votes for the incumbent, who
they believe is more competent, while the hindsight biased population disagrees and votes for
the challenger. Thus, if  > 1=2 rationality decides the election, the incumbent is conrmed
in oce and the outcome of the election is unaected by hindsight bias. The reverse is true
for  < 1=2.
In the model analyzed above the signal can only take two values. An alternative as-
sumption is to have a continuous instead of a binary signal.40 Hindsight bias could then be
modeled as a shift of the recollected signal towards the outcome that actually occurred. For
the event (a1;0), the analysis would not be modied because voters' posterior would be zero
regardless of the signal. However, in the event (a1;) a continuous signal would complicate
40 In terms of the welfare-maximizing policy, there would be a cuto signal below which policy a0 is optimal
and above which policy a1 is.
21the analysis considerably. Unlike in the binary case where only 0 is distorted while 1 is
correctly remembered (see table 1), hindsight bias would aect voters' recollection for all pos-
sible realizations of the ex ante signal (except at the upper bound of the distribution). This
implies that hindsight bias would not be unambiguously benecial in terms of discipline; the
overall eect on discipline would depend on the distribution of the signal. Our results would
remain valid for some, but not all, distributional assumptions.
5 Selection and welfare
Proposition 1 shows that hindsight bias improves the discipline of the (low-ability) incumbent.
Therefore, the eect of hindsight bias on voters' rst-period welfare is unambiguously positive.
To make a general statement about the impact of hindsight bias on welfare, however, we must
also take into account second-period welfare. This means we have to investigate the eect
on selection: Because in the second period, the politician always implements the policy that,
according to his information, is best, voters are weakly better o if a high-ability politician
is in oce.
We can focus on the case where the rst-period signal is 0, since hindsight bias changes
nothing when the signal is 1. The eect of hindsight bias on selection works through two
channels. The rst is that voters sometimes have erroneous posteriors, so that they don't
always elect the politician that is truly more able (in expected terms); this clearly is bad for
welfare. Hindsight bias essentially blurs the two major elements voters initially set out to
distinguish in their evaluation, namely skill and luck of the decision maker. The second is
more indirect: since the anticipation of voters' hindsight bias changes the low-ability politi-
cian's behavior, the inferences that can be drawn from a given event are also modied. The
welfare implications of this second eect are more complex. Hindsight bias increases the low
type's equilibrium probability of playing a0 after receiving 0. This decreases the posterior
probability of a high type after observing a0, while the posterior probability of a high type
after observing (a1;) increases.
Since, in general, both of these eects are at work, the selection eects of hindsight bias
are ambiguous. However, it follows from the above discussion that, if we x s(0), only the
rst eect operates. In that case, hindsight bias is detrimental to selection. This allows us to
derive a polar case for which hindsight biased selection is dominated by rational selection.
Formally, denote the expected second-period welfare when a low (high) type is in oce
by wL (wH).41 Clearly, wH > wL. Let w(z) = zwH + (1   z)wL be the expected second-
41 Although of no relevance for the analysis, these expectations can be calculated. Since in the second
period, the low-ability politician always follows his signal, we have: wH = (1   )(   c) and wL = (1  
)x(   c)   (1   x)c.
22period welfare when the probability that the politician has high ability is z. Therefore,
expected second-period welfare when an incumbent with reputation  is reelected is w(),
while expected welfare when a challenger of perceived ability C is elected is w(C). For
notational simplicity, we will adopt the following conventions throughout this section:
0(s) 
I0
I0 + (1   I)(1   s)
1(s) 
I
I + (1   I)s
where 0(s) is voters' posterior belief that the politician is competent given that he chose a0
after observing 0 and that the low-type's strategy is s, while 1(s) is the posterior belief
after event (a1;).42
After the rst-period signal 0 (but before policy choice and outcome realization), the
ex ante expected second-period welfare with rational voters, as a function of the low type's
strategy s, can be written as
EWR(s) =
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+ (1   0)
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In words, ex ante expected second-period welfare is the weighted sum of welfare in each of
the three possible events (a0;0), (a1;0) and (a1;), taking expectations over the challenger's
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This expression reveals the eect of hindsight bias on selection: a politician who succeeds
with a risky policy is reelected with probability 1(s
R(1)), even though the actual posterior
probability of him being a high type is 1(s).












Figure 6: Expected second-period welfare: Rational vs biased voters
Lemma 4 For a given s, rational voters can expect to be better o in the second period than
hindsight biased voters:
EWR(s)  EWB(s) 8s 2 [0;1]
with strict inequality for s 6= s
R(1).
Lemma 4, illustrated in gure 6, conrms the above-mentioned intuition according to
which, for a given s, only the negative eect of hindsight bias is at work, which is to distort
posterior beliefs and thereby lead to wrong voting decisions. The following proposition ex-
ploits this result to show that hindsight bias is detrimental to selection for particular values
of signal precision.
Proposition 3 In terms of selection, voters are better o being rational rather than hindsight
biased for any 0  R
0 and for a nonempty set of values of 0 below R
0 .
Thus, hindsight bias is bad for voters' expected second-period welfare at least when 0 is in
the vicinity of R
0 . When moving further below R
0 , the eect of hindsight bias on selection is
ambiguous and depends on parameters; hindsight bias can sometimes even improve selection.
But even for those cases where the bias harms voters in terms of second-period welfare, this
eect has to be contrasted with the positive eect on discipline (and thus rst-period welfare).
Proposition 4 Whatever the eect of hindsight bias on selection, there exists a discount
factor ^  2 (0;1] such that hindsight bias improves overall welfare for any   ^ .
According to this proposition, hindsight bias can be welfare-enhancing regardless of what
happens in the second period: because voters discount the future, discipline is more important
than selection for a suciently low discount factor.
24Finally, we examine the reelection chances for each type of politician (low-ability and
high-ability). This will allow us to assess the impact of hindsight bias on political turnover,
dened as the rate of replacement of the politician holding oce. The following lemma
compares the posterior beliefs held by rational and hindsight biased voters in the 0 subgame
upon observing an action and outcome.
Lemma 5 If 0 < R


































Given Lemma 5, the analysis of the politician's reelection chances becomes straightfor-
ward. Consider rst the L-type politician. With rational voters, his ex ante probability of
reelection when the signal is 0, which we denote RR
L, is given by
RR













while in the case of hindsight biased voters, it is
RB













Turning to the H type, his probability of reelection with rational voters is
RR











while with hindsight biased voters, it is
RB











The next proposition compares the politician's reelection prospects in the presence of
rational and hindsight biased voters.
Proposition 5 Suppose 0 < R
0 . Both low-ability and high-ability politicians are less likely





H. Thus, hindsight bias increases political turnover.
Our model predicts that political turnover is larger when voters are hindsight biased
(because both low and high type are less likely to be reelected). This result follows directly
from the fact that, irrespective of the outcome, rational voters always have a (weakly) higher
opinion of the politician than hindsight biased ones; see Lemma 5. The result is in line with
conventional wisdom which holds that, when evaluating somebody else's performance, an
individual suering from hindsight bias gives less credit than is due in case of success, and
more blame than is warranted in case of failure.
256 Conclusion
We have constructed a political-agency model where voters exhibit a cognitive deciency
known as hindsight bias: after the uncertainty about an event is resolved, they consider
the realized outcome more foreseeable than it actually was. In the model, voters have to
evaluate the incumbent politician in order to decide whether to reelect him or replace him
with a challenger. Politicians are assumed to dier in ability, where ability corresponds to the
quality of their information about the welfare-maximizing policy. High-ability politicians are
better informed than low-ability politicians and voters. In this setup, low-ability politicians
have incentives to disregard public information on what the optimal policy is in order to
appear to have superior private information. We have shown that hindsight bias on the part
of voters can act as a discipline device. This is because hindsight biased voters are less easily
impressed by a successful gamble { they think it was the obvious choice to make from the
outset, even if the available information had suggested otherwise. Therefore, they give an
incumbent who succeeds with a risky policy in spite of public pessimism less credit than
rational voters who perfectly recall their prior. Anticipating this, low-ability politicians are
less likely to deviate from the welfare-maximizing policy.
The disciplining eect of hindsight bias is unambiguously benecial for voters' rst-period
welfare. However, an overall welfare assessment also has to take into account the second (i.e.,
post-election) period. Hindsight biased voters' evaluation of an incumbent's competence is
less precise than that of rational voters. There is some range of signal precision for which
this eect dominates any potential osetting benets for selection that hindsight bias may
generate through its eect on the low type's behavior. In this case, hindsight bias does not
serve voters well in terms of second-period welfare. Nevertheless, as far as overall welfare is
concerned, hindsight bias can be welfare-enhancing irrespective of its selection eects if voters
discount future payos at a suciently high rate. A nal result, in line with conventional
wisdom about hindsight bias, is that both the low- and the high-ability politician are less
likely to be reelected when voters are hindsight biased than when they are rational, i.e.,
political turnover is increased.
Due to the multidimensional nature of real-life politics, proving the empirical relevance of
hindsight bias is a dicult task. We provide here some anecdotal evidence from an episode of
U.S. politics for which public opinion is particularly well-documented: the Gulf War of 1991
(Mueller, 1994). A case can be made that hindsight bias contributed to George Bush Sr.'s
defeat in the 1992 presidential election. Bush had initiated military action in response to
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, an endeavor of considerable political risk, and come away with
what observers unanimously viewed as a huge success. With Bayesian voters, Bush's success
26in Iraq should have shown up positively in his foreign-policy approval rate. In the immediate
post-war euphoria, his approval rate did indeed go up. However, by April of 1992, approval
for the President's foreign policy was back to (or even slightly below) its pre-war level.43 This
seems to indicate that voters, in retrospect, did not give Bush much credit for the successful
operation in the Gulf, an interpretation which is corroborated by opinion polls bearing out
voters' hindsight bias (see the introductory quote by Mueller (1994)). If the use of military
force seemed like an obvious choice to voters, the war will not have had much impact on
Bush's perceived competence, and therefore not have helped him much in the November 1992
election, which he lost to Bill Clinton.44
Our analysis may be applicable to problems beyond political economy, for example, pro-
motion decisions in organizations (which, much like elections, do not follow rules set forth
in an explicit ex ante contract). Consider a human resource department that has to decide
whether to promote an employee from inside the rm, whose actions and performance have
been observed, or to hire an outsider for the job. In a rm, there typically is some amount of
public information concerning the way an employee is supposed to handle his task (in terms
of the model, what the right choice of action is), but employees may also have superior infor-
mation on their specic assignment. Our model would predict that, if anticipated, hindsight
bias on the part of the human resource manager (or decision committee) may prevent low-
ability employees from deviating to suboptimal actions in order to appear smart, but would
not necessarily help in choosing the right candidate.
We close by noting that, with the benet of hindsight, all of our results are, of course,
obvious.
43 See Mueller (1994, table 3); approval rates for Bush's handling of the situation in the Middle East follow
the same pattern. The gradual decline in the approval rate is consistent with experimental evidence according
to which hindsight bias increases over time (Bryant and Brockway, 1997).
44 There is some question as to whether the war in Iraq was an important factor in voters' election decision.
While as late as September 1992, almost 70% of likely voters indeed said that the war was important (Mueller,
1994, table 282), political scientists have come to view the election as largely decided by issues other than
foreign policy. Notice, however, that this is not inconsistent with hindsight bias having in
uenced the election.
In fact, if voters thought that the decision to use military force was a \no-brainer", its favorable outcome
should not have played much of a role in their updating of the President's perceived competence, compared to
other, seemingly more informative issues, such as his handling of the economy.
27Appendix
A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1:
The proof proceeds as follows. First, taking as given that the high-ability politician plays
mechanically as stated in the lemma, we derive the conditions for pure-strategy equilibria
with either s
R(0) = 0 or s
R(0) = 1. We show that an equilibrium with s
R(0) = 1 is
impossible under Assumption 1; we then prove the existence of a threshold R
0 as described
in the lemma and establish when it is within the set of values that are admissible for 0 under
Assumption 1. Second, we show that the high-ability politician indeed nds it optimal to
follow the equilibrium strategy.
A necessary and sucient condition for a pure-strategy equilibrium where s(0) = 0 is
that type L prefers a0 even though voters believe that he will always follow the signal. This
condition is obtained by evaluating U0
0 and U
0;R
1 at s(0) = 0, that is
[(1   0)   c]  (1   )

I0
1   I(1   0)
  (1   0)

: (19)
A pure-strategy equilibrium with s(0) = 1 would require that the low type prefer a1 even




1 at s(0) = 1:
[(1   0)   c]  (1   )[1   I(1   0)]: (20)
If neither (19) nor (20) hold, we are in a mixed-strategy equilibrium where the low type
randomizes between actions a0 and a1.
As 0 ! 1, condition (19) is always satised, while as 0 ! 0, it can never be satised.
Together with the monotonicity of both left- and right-hand side of (19) with respect to 0,
this proves that there exists a unique threshold R
0 as stated in the lemma. However, condition
(20) cannot be satised for any 0 > 1   c=; thus, there is no equilibrium with s(0) = 1.
For the threshold R
0 to be greater than 1 c=, the limit of the right-hand side of (19) must




1   I(1   0)
  (1   0) < 0
, I <
c
(   c)2 + c
:
For values below R
0 , the equilibrium is in mixed strategies. For the type L politician
to be willing to randomize, voters' beliefs must be such that U0
0 = U
0;R
1 . Moreover, these
28beliefs must be derived from equilibrium strategies. Thus, the only s(0) that constitutes an
equilibrium is obtained by equating (1) and (2), yielding (3).
We now show that, given voters' beliefs, it is indeed optimal for the high-ability politician









Now consider type (H;! = 1). If 0  R
0 , and hence s
R(0) = 0, he prefers a1 because
(1   )
I0
1   I(1   0)
< (   c) + 1   :
Turning to the mixed-strategy case where 0 < R
0 and hence 0 < s
R(0) < 1, type (H;! = 1)
also strictly prefers a1. Indeed,
(1   )
I0
I0 + (1   I)(1   s
R(0))
< (   c) + (1   )
I
I + (1   I)s
R(0)
;
because (3) must hold.
Finally, we prove the claimed monotonicity property of the equilibrium strategy by ap-
plying the implicit function theorem. Let F0;R  U0
0   U
0;R








It is straightforward to see that @F0;R=@s > 0, while @F0;R=@0 > 0. Hence, ds
R(0)=d0 < 0.

Proof of Lemma 2:
The proof is similar to the one for Lemma 1. First, taking the high-ability politician's
mechanical play as given, we derive the conditions for pure-strategy equilibria with either
s
R(1) = 1 or s
R(1) = 0. We prove the existence of thresholds R
1 and R
1 as described in
the lemma and establish when they are in the range of values that are admissible for 1 under
Assumption 1. Second, we show that the high-ability politician indeed nds it optimal to
follow the equilibrium strategy.
A necessary and sucient condition for a pure-strategy equilibrium where s(1) = 1 is
that type L prefers a1 even though voters believe that he will always follow the signal. This
condition is obtained by evaluating U1
0 and U1
1 at s(1) = 1, that is
[1   c]  (1   )[1   I1]: (21)
29A pure-strategy equilibrium with s(1) = 0 requires that the low type prefer a0 even though
he could fool voters about his type by playing a1 and succeeding. The associated condition
is obtained by evaluating U1
0 and U1
1 at s(1) = 0:







If neither (21) nor (22) hold, we are in a mixed-strategy equilibrium where the low type
randomizes between actions a0 and a1.
Since the left-hand side of both (21) and (22) is increasing in 1, while the right-hand side
of each of those conditions is decreasing in 1, the thresholds R
1 and R
1 exist. Also, R
1 < R
1
since I(1   1)=(1   I1)   1 < 1   I1 for any I < 1. What remains to be shown is
when these thresholds are within the set of values consistent with Assumption 1. As 1 ! 1,
condition (21) is satised if I > 1   (   c)=(1   ), while as 1 ! c=, it can never be
satised. Condition (22), though, cannot be satised for 1  R
1 . As 1 ! c=, it is satised
if and only if I > c=((   c)2 + c) (see the proof of Lemma 1).
For values between R
1 and R
1 , the equilibrium is in mixed strategies. For a type L
politician to be willing to randomize, voters' beliefs must be such that U1
0 = U1
1. Moreover,
these beliefs must be derived from equilibrium strategies. Thus, the only s(1) that constitutes
an equilibrium is obtained by equating (5) and (6), yielding (7).
We now show that, given the voters' beliefs, it is indeed optimal for the high-ability









Now consider type (H;! = 1). If 1  R
1 , and hence s
R(1) = 1, he prefers a1 because
1    < (   c) + (1   )I
is a necessary condition for the low type to play a pure strategy with s(1) = 1. In the
mixed-strategy case where R
1 < 1 < R
1 and hence 0 < s
R(1) < 1, type (H;! = 1) also
strictly prefers a1 since
(1   )
I(1   1)
I(1   1) + (1   I)(1   s
R(1))
< (   c) + (1   )
I
I + (1   I)s
R(1)
follows from (7). And if 1 < R
1 so that s(1) = 0, type (H;!1) has a strict preference for




< (   c) + 1   :
30Finally, we prove the claimed monotonicity property of the equilibrium strategy by ap-










It is straightforward to see that @F1=@s > 0 and @F1=@1 < 0. Hence, ds(1)=d1 > 0. 
Proof of Lemma 3:
Once again, we will take as given, in a rst step, that the high-ability politician plays
mechanically as stated in the lemma, and derive the conditions for pure-strategy equilibria
with either s
B(0) = 0 or s
B(0) = 1. We show that an equilibrium with s
B(0) = 1 is
impossible under Assumption 1; we then prove the existence of a threshold B
0 as described
in the lemma and establish when it is within the set of values that are admissible for 0 under
Assumption 1. Second, we show that the high-ability politician indeed nds it optimal to
follow the equilibrium strategy.
A necessary and sucient condition for a pure-strategy equilibrium where s(0) = 0 is
that type L prefers a0 even though voters believe that he will always follow the signal. From
(8) and (9), the condition is
[(1   0)   c]  (1   )

I0
1   I(1   0)
 
(1   0)I




A pure-strategy equilibrium with s(0) = 1 would require that the low type prefer a1 even
though he could fool voters about his type by playing a0. The associated condition is








If neither (23) nor (24) hold, we are in a mixed-strategy equilibrium where a low type ran-
domizes between actions a0 and a1.
As 0 ! 1, condition (23) is always satised, while as 0 ! 0, it can never be satised.
Together with the monotonicity of both left- and right-hand side of (23) with respect to 0,
this proves that there exists a unique threshold B
0 as stated in the lemma. Condition (24)
cannot be satised for any 0 > 1   c=; thus, there is no equilibrium with s(0) = 1. For
the threshold B
0 to be greater than 1 c=, the limit of the right-hand side of (19) must be




1   I(1   0)
 
(1   0)I




(   c)(1   s
R(1)) + 2c   2
(   c)(1   s
R(1)) + c2 :
31For values below B
0 , the equilibrium is in mixed strategies. For a L type politician to be
willing to randomize, voters' beliefs must be such that U0
0 = U
0;B
1 , with beliefs derived from
equilibrium strategies. Thus, the only s(0) that constitutes an equilibrium is obtained by
equating (8) and (9), yielding equation (10) stated in the lemma.
What remains to be shown is that a high-ability politician chooses to play the policy
corresponding to !, given biased voters' beliefs. Consider rst type (H;! = 0). This type




I0 + (1   I)(1   s
B(0))
>  c:
For type (H;! = 1) we need to consider two cases. In the rst case, if 0  B
0 , in which type
L plays the pure strategy s
B(0) = 0, the high-ability politician prefers action a1 because
(1   )
I0
1   I(1   0)
| {z }
I
< (   c) + (1   )
I





In the second case, if 0 < B
0 , in which a L type plays the mixed strategy 0 < s
B(0) < 1,
type (H;! = 1) also prefers a1 since
(1   )
I0
I0 + (1   I)(1   s
B(0))
< (   c) + (1   )
I
I + (1   I)s
R(1)
;
where the inequality follows from the fact that, in a mixed-strategy equilibrium, the indier-
ence condition given in (10) must hold.
The proof concludes by establishing the claimed monotonicity property of the equilibrium
strategy. For this we apply the implicit function theorem. Let F0;B  U0
0   U
0;B









It is straightforward to see that @F0;B=@s < 0, while @F0;B=@0 > 0. Therefore ds
B(0)=d0 >
0. 
Proof of Proposition 1:
We start by showing that R
0 > B
0 , i.e., the minimum signal precision required to have
s(0) = 0 in equilibrium is greater in the rational than in the biased evaluation regime. This
result is immediate when comparing the right-hand side of equations (4) and (11) (cf. Lemma
1 and 3) since, as a result of Assumption 2, s
R(1) > 0 for any 1.
Since R
0 > B
0 , it follows that 8 0 2 (B
0 ;R
0 ), we have s
B(0) = 0 by Lemma 1 while
s
R(0) > 0 by Lemma 3, and hence the claimed result holds. What remains to be shown is























Figure 7: Determination of the low-type's equilibrium strategy
Figure 7 illustrates the logic of the argument. For 0  B
0 , the equilibrium is in mixed
strategies with both rational and hindsight biased voters. Thus, s




1 ), while s





monotone increasing in s(0). U
0;R
1 is monotone decreasing in s(0). U
0;B
1 is constant with
respect to s(0).









1 , dening s




1 , dening s
R(0), if and only if s
R(1) > s
R(0). But this is precisely the subject of
Corollary 1; the strict inequality follows from Assumption 2. 
Proof of Proposition 2:
Given an ex ante signal 0, the utility for a L-type politician from playing a0 does not











1 + (1   r)U
0;R
1 :
Thus, it is a convex combination of the payos with rational and naive hindsight biased
voters. Reliability r, given in (12), satises 0 < r < 1 for any s(0) 2 [0;1]. Moreover, simpli-
fying the expression determining a type-L politician's reputational value under sophisticated
evaluation (the second term in (13)) using (12), as
r(1;a1;) + (1   r)(0;a1;) =
I
I + (1   I)[xs
R(1) + (1   x)s(0)]
;
33it is clear that U
0;S




R(0), where the strict inequality is due to 0 < R
0 . 
Proof of Lemma 4:
We rst simplify the expression for EWR(s). By linearity of w(), we have
R 
0 w()dC =








0I + (1   I)(1   s)

0(s)[w(0(s))   wL]=2 +
+ (1   0)
 


















+ (1   0)
 
















0I + (1   I)(1   s)
+ (1   0)
2
I
I + (1   I)s

;








0 0(s) + (1   0)1(s)

: (25)









+ (1   0)1(s
R(1))
I + (1   I)(2s
R(1)   s)




Comparing the two expectations boils down to
EWR(s)  EWB(s)
, [I + (1   I)s
R(1)]
2  [I + (1   I)s][I + (1   I)(2s
R(1)   s)]:
Make the following change of variable:   s   s
R(1) with  2 [ s
R(1);1   s
R(1)]. Then,
the above inequality is equivalent to
[I + (1   I)s
R(1)]
2  [I + (1   I)(s
R(1) + )][I + (1   I)(s
R(1)   )]
which is true for any  and strictly so for  6= 0. Hence, EWR(s)  EWB(s) for any s with
strict inequality for s 6= s
R(1). 
34Proof of Proposition 3:
For 0  R
0 , s
R(0) = 0 by Lemma 1, and s
B(0) = 0 by Proposition 1. By Lemma 4,
EWR(0) > EWB(0), and by continuity, this must also hold when decreasing 0 slightly below
R
0 . 
Proof of Proposition 4:
This is immediate from the previous discussion given that overall expected welfare is the
discounted sum of rst- and second-period welfare. 
Proof of Lemma 5:
Inequality (14) follows directly from the fact that s
R(0) > s
B(0) whenever 0 < R
0 , a
result established in Proposition 1. Pessimistic beliefs ensure that (15) holds for any s(0).
Inequality (16) is satised because s
R(0) < s
R(1); see Corollary 1. 
Proof of Proposition 5:




















it must be the case that RB
 < RR
 for all ; the probability
weights attached to the dierent posteriors do not matter. 
B Elimination of alternative equilibria with criterion D1
It is a well-known fact that, because it does not pin down out-of-equilibrium beliefs, the PBE
concept is often plagued by multiple equilibria. In our case, there exist equilibria other than
those described in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 satisfying criteria (i) through (iii) of Denition 1;
namely, pooling equilibria where all types of politician choose the same policy irrespective of
their information. Consider the following sets of strategies and beliefs:
 All types pool on a0, and voters believe that any politician who plays a1 is of type L
with probability one, i.e., (;a1;y) = 0;
 all types pool on a1, and voters believe that any politician who plays a0 is of type L
with probability one, i.e., (;a0;0) = 0.
The rst of these candidates requires
1 
 I >    c, the second
1 
 I > c, to be an
equilibrium.
35Both of these equilibria can be eliminated using the D1 criterion which puts restrictions
on out-of-equilibrium beliefs.45 We show this for the rst of the two candidates (pooling on
a0); the argument can be applied in an analogous way to the other.
Whatever his type, the politician's equilibrium payo is (1 )I. Let 
 denote a mixed ac-
tion for the voters, i.e., 




as the set of mixed best responses to action a1 that makes a politician of type  and with









 2 MBR(;a1) : (1   )I < E(Wj	) + (1   )
g;




denote the set of responses for which the politician is indierent.
According to the D1 criterion, a type (;	) can be deleted for action a1 if there exists













where  denotes a strict inclusion.




for the dierent types in the most interesting case





1   c for L
 c for (H;! = 0)
   c for (H;! = 1)
The voters' best response to a1 depends on . Suppose that the perceived ability of the
challenger is C. The voters' best response is \vote for incumbent" if  > C, \vote for
challenger" if  < C, and any mixed action 
 2 [0;1] if  = C. Thus, any 
 is a mixed best

































, so that type L (and, a
fortiori, type (H;! = 0)) can be pruned based on criterion D1. That is, voters should
believe that a deviation to a1 is innitely more likely to come from type (H;! = 1) than
from L, in which case they should reelect the incumbent. Anticipating this, the high-ability
politician will not stick to his prescribed equilibrium strategy when observing ! = 1, and the
equilibrium breaks down.
45 D1, a renement developed by Cho and Kreps (1987), is a slightly stronger version of Banks and Sobel's
(1987) \divinity" concept.
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